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Abstract
We study the first- and second-order asymptotics of covert communication over binary-input Discrete Memoryless Channels
(DMCs) for three different covertness metrics and under maximum probability of error constraint. When covertness is measured in
terms of the relative entropy between the channel output distributions induced with and without communication, we characterize
the exact first- and second-order asymptotics of the number of bits that can be reliably transmitted with a maximum probability of
error less than  and a relative entropy less than δ. When covertness is measured in terms of the variational distance between the
channel output distributions or in terms of the probability of missed detection for fixed probability of false alarm, we establish the
exact first-order asymptotics and bound the second-order asymptotics. Pulse-Position Modulation (PPM) achieves the optimal first-
order asymptotics for all three metrics, as well as the optimal second-order asymptotics for relative entropy. The main conceptual
contribution of this paper is to clarify how the choice of a covertness metric impacts the information-theoretic limits of covert
communications. The main technical contribution underlying our results is a detailed expurgation argument to show the existence
of a code satisfying the reliability and covertness criteria.
I. INTRODUCTION
While most information-theoretic security works to date have revolved around the issues of confidentiality and authentica-
tion [2], [3], [4], the growing concern around mass communication surveillance programs has reignited interest in investigating
the covertness of communications, also known as Low Probability of Detection (LPD). In LPD problems, the objective is
to hide the presence of communication and not necessarily to prevent information leakage about the messages transmitted.
Following the analysis of LPD with space-time codes [5], recent works have investigated the information-theoretic limits of
covert communications over noisy channel [6], [7]. In particular, building upon concepts from steganography [8], the study
in [6] shows the existence of a “square-root law” for covert communication, which essentially states that no more than O(
√
n)
bits can be communicated covertly over n channel uses of a memoryless channel.
The square-root law of covert communication has been refined in several follow-up works [9]; in particular, the information-
theoretic limits are now known for classical discrete and Gaussian memoryless channels [10], [11], classical-quantum chan-
nels [12], [13], and multiple-access channels [14], when covertness is measured in terms of the relative entropy between the
channel output distributions induced with and without communication. Note that the choice of relative entropy as a metric
for covertness is guided in part by the natural connection between relative entropy and information-theoretic metrics, such as
entropy and mutual information, which have been largely explored in the context of information-theoretic security [15].
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, as an attempt to develop operational characterizations of covertness,
we study the information-theoretic limits of covert communication for alternative metrics, including variational distance, and
probability of missed detection. Second, motivated by the likely time-limited nature of covert communications, we make a
first step towards a finite-length analysis and extend the first-order analysis of information-theoretic limits to second-order
asymptotics. The specific results developed in the present paper focus on binary-input DMCs to yield simple closed-form
expressions and are the following.
• We characterize the exact second-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be
transmitted with maximum probability of error  and relative entropy δ between channel output distributions with and
without communication (Theorem 1); this corrects an unfortunate error in the conference version [1], in which we claimed
erroneous second-order asymptotics for arbitrary codes.
• We characterize the exact first-order and bound the second-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable and
covert bits that can be transmitted with maximum probability of error  and variational distance δ between channel output
distributions with and without communication (Theorem 2).
• Finally, we characterize the exact first-order and bound the second-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reliable
and covert bits that can be transmitted with maximum probability of error  and probability of missed detection 1−α− δ
when α is the adversary’s probability of false alarm (Theorem 3).
All our achievability results are established using Pulse-Position Modulation (PPM), which optimality was previously only
established for the first-order asymptotics with relative entropy [16]. The operational relevance of codes used in conjunction
with PPM, which may be viewed as a highly structured subset of constant composition codes, is justified by recent work
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2towards practical code design [17], in which PPM plays a crucial role. We also emphasize from the outset that the focus
on maximal probability of error is essential to our analysis. As discussed in Remark 1 and Appendix A, there is no strong
converse for average probability of error without additional constraint; hence, considering the maximum probability of error as
the reliability metric is reasonable for second-order analysis.
The second-order asymptotics obtained with a relative entropy metric for covertness are what could have been expected by
extrapolating the results of channel coding in the finite length regime [18] to the first-order asymptotics of covert communica-
tion [10], [11]; however, the proof requires specific techniques beyond those used to study the first-order asymptotics of covert
communications and second-order asymptotics of classical communication. First, as already mentioned, the achievability proof
relies on PPM codes [16] instead of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random codes. Second, unlike the analysis of
the second-order asymptotics of reliable and secure communications [18], [19], we have to deal here with parameters capturing
reliability and covertness, with the latter appearing in the first-order asymptotics; more specifically, the optimal coding scheme
identified in [10] exploits a code with a bin structure, in which each bin forms a reliability code for the legitimate channel
indexed by the secret key while the overall code forms a resolvability code for the adversary’s channel. To prove the existence
of a code with the desired characteristics, we expurgate a random code after resorting to concentration of measure inequalities
such as McDiarmid’s Inequality and carefully analyzing the probability of error. We point out that our current results only
identify the second-order asymptotics for the number of transmitted message bits and do not characterize the second-order
asymptotics for the number of key bits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally introduce the model of covert communication
and state our main results. In Section III, we develop a series of metric-independent results that form the basis of our analysis
of covert communication. In Section IV-A, Section IV-B, and Section IV-C, we exploit the results of Section III to study a
relative entropy metric, variational distance metric, and probability of missed-detection metric for covertness, respectively. In
Section V, we conclude the paper with a discussion of possible further extensions and improvements.
II. MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Notation
Throughout the paper, log and exp should be understood in base e. Moreover, random variables are denoted with upper case
letters, e.g. X , while their realizations are denoted with lower case letters, e.g., x. The distribution of a random variable such
as X is denoted by PX . Calligraphic letters are used for sets, e.g., X , and boldface fonts are used for vectors e.g., x. For two
integers a and b, if a 6 b, we define Ja, bK , {a, a + 1, · · · , b − 1, b}; otherwise Ja, bK , ∅. For any distribution P over X ,
P ⊗n denotes the product distribution over Xn, i.e., P ⊗n(x) , ∏ni=1 P (xi). For two distributions P and Q over the same set
X , we define
D(P‖Q) ,
∑
x
P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x)
(relative entropy), (1)
V(P,Q) , 1
2
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)| (variational distance), (2)
χ2(P ||Q) ,
∑
x
(P (x)−Q(x))2
Q(x)
(chi-squared distance), (3)
βα(P,Q) , inf
T⊂X :P (X\T )6α
Q(T ) (optimal probability of missed detection). (4)
The notation P  Q means that P is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Q, i.e., if Q(x) = 0 for some x ∈ X then
P (x) = 0. A DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) consists of a finite input alphabet X , a finite output alphabet Y , and a transition probability
WY |X such that WY |X(y|x) indicates the probability of obtaining y at the output given that x is transmitted at the input. For
a DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) and two distributions PX and QY on X and Y , we define
PY (y) ,
∑
x
PX(x)WY |X(y|x), (5)
I(PX ,WY |X) ,
∑
x,y
PX(x)WY |X(y|x) log
WY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
, (6)
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Fig. 1. Model of covert communications over noisy channels
and for any γ,
FXY |QY (γ) , PWY |XPX
(
log
WY |X(Y |X)
QY (Y )
6 γ
)
=
∑
x,y
PX(x)WY |X(y|x)1
{
log
WY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
6 γ
}
, (7)
FXY |QYX=x(γ) , PWY |XPX
(
log
WY |X(Y |X)
QY (Y )
6 γ
∣∣∣∣∣X = x
)
=
∑
y
WY |X(y|x)1
{
log
WY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
6 γ
}
, (8)
FXY (γ) , FXY |PY (γ), (9)
FXY (γ) , 1− FXY (γ). (10)
Moreover, given codewords {xi}Mi=1 ∈ XM and a uniform random variable W ∈ J1,MK, P̂WXY denotes the joint distribution
induced on (W,X, Y ), i.e.,
P̂WXY (w, x, y) ,
1
M
1{xw = x}WY |X(y|x). (11)
For any discrete random variable A, let µA , mina:P(A=a)>0 P(A = a). For a real number x, we also define the Q-function
Q(x) ,
∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx and [x]+ , max(0, x). Moreover, for sequences {an}, {bn}, and {cn}, we have an = bn + O(cn)
if and only if there exists a constant K independent of n such that |an − bn| 6 Kcn for all n. Finally, for x ∈ {0, 1}n,
wt(x) , |{i ∈ J1, nK : xi = 1}| is the weight of x.
B. Model and main results
We consider the situation illustrated in Fig. 1, in which a legitimate transmitter communicates with a legitimate receiver over
a DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) in the presence of an adversary who observes communication through another DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z).
There is no loss in generality in ignoring the joint channel WY Z|X , as we shall see that results only depend on the marginal
channels WY |X and WZ|X . Furthermore, to obtain simple closed-form expressions, we assume in the sequel that X = {0, 1},
where 0 is an “innocent symbol” corresponding to the expected input of the channel if no communication were taking place.
The extension beyond binary-inputs is briefly outlined in Section V. We also denote the output distribution induced by each
input symbol by
P0 ,WY |X=0, P1 ,WY |X=1, (12)
Q0 ,WZ|X=0, Q1 ,WZ|X=1, (13)
where it is assumed that Q1  Q0, P1  P0 and Q1 6= Q0. These assumptions are necessary for our results to hold.
In fact, without Q1  Q0, covert communication is impossible as some input symbols detect the use of the non-innocent
symbol with probability one. At the other extreme, if Q1 = Q0 then no detector can distinguish the use of innocent and
non-innocent symbols so that the problem reduces to classical communication. Finally, without P1  P0, Alice and Bob have
an unfair advantage that allows them to exchange ω(
√
n) bits covertly [10, Theorem 7]. The objective is for the transmitter to
communicate a uniformly distributed message W ∈ J1,MK with a small probability of error while ensuring low probability
of detection from the adversary. The communication may be assisted by a uniformly distributed shared secret key S ∈ J1,KK.
A formal description of a code is as follows.
Definition 1. A code of blocklength n consists of an encoder/decoder pair
f : J1,KK× J1,MK→ Xn and φ : Yn × J1,KK→ J1,MK, (14)
which induces the distribution P̂Z at the adversary’s channel output, defined for z ∈ Zn as
P̂Z(z) ,
K∑
s=1
M∑
w=1
1
MK
W ⊗nZ|X(z|f(s, w)). (15)
4A code is -reliable, if the pair (f, φ) is such that
P ∗err , max
s∈J1,KK,w∈J1,MKP(φ(Y, s) 6= W |S = s,W = w) 6 . (16)
Moreover, an -reliable code defined by (f, φ) is:
• an (M,K, n, , δ)D code, if it satisfies
D
(
P̂Z‖Q⊗n0
)
6 δ; (17)
• an (M,K, n, , δ)V code, if it satisfies
V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
6 δ; (18)
• an (M,K, n, , δ, α)β code, if if it satisfies
βα(Q
⊗n
0 , P̂Z) > 1− α− δ. (19)
The maximum number of messages that can be transmitted by an (M,K, n, , δ)D, (M,K, n, , δ)V , and (M,K, n, , δ, α)β
code is denoted by M∗D(n, , δ), M
∗
V (n, , δ), and M
∗
β(n, , δ, α), respectively.
Remark 1. The definition of the probability of error in (16) differs from previous studies [11], [10]; we ask that the maximum
probability of error be small for any choice of the key S and message W . This more stringent condition captures a pragmatic
requirement and is critical to our converse argument. As shown in Appendix A, analyzing the average probability of error is a
different and (we believe) substantially more difficult endeavor since there is no strong converse for the reliability parameter.
This intriguing behavior appears because one can slightly increase the average probability of error without any effect on
covertness by simply adding all-zero codewords to the codebook. This of course leads to what one would consider as “bad
codes,” which we avoid by focusing on the maximal probability of error.
Remark 2. The three covertness metrics in (17)-(19) have slightly different operational meanings. When enforcing that the
probability of missed detection satisfy βα(Q⊗n0 , P̂Z) > 1−α−δ for a fixed probability of false alarm α, one implicitly assumes
that the adversary optimizes its detector at a specific point of the Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC) curve with known
probability of false alarm. In contrast, when enforcing V(P̂Z, Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ, since α + βα(Q⊗n0 , P̂Z) > 1 − V(P̂Z, Q⊗n0 ) for any
probability of false alarm α, one essentially wishes to enforce covertness irrespective of the exact operating point on the
adversary’s ROC curve. Finally, since V(P̂Z, Q⊗n0 )
2 6 12D(P̂Z‖Q⊗n0 ) by Pinsker’s Inequality, the constraint D(P̂Z‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ
is more stringent than when using variational distance, but only provides a loose proxy for constraining the ROC curve since
Pinsker’s inequality is not tight..1 The relations between the covertness metrics immediately lead to the following ordering of
the maximum number of covert bits.
M∗D(n, , δ) 6M∗V (n, ,
√
δ
2
) 6 min
α∈[0,1]
M∗β(n, ,
√
δ
2
, α). (20)
Our main results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 characterize the maximum number of reliable and covert bits
defined above as a function of the channel characteristics and the blocklength n. In all cases, the first and second terms behave
as Θ (n
1
2 ) and Θ (n
1
4 ), respectively, as expected; nevertheless, the constant behind Θ(·) is metric-specific.
Theorem 1. For  ∈]0, 1[ and δ > 0, we have
logM *D(n, , δ) =
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)DPn
1
2 −
√√√√√ 2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)VPQ
−1()n
1
4 +O(log n), (21)
with
DP , D(P1‖P0), VP , Var
(
log
P1(Y )
P0(Y )
∣∣∣∣P1). (22)
This optimal number of message bits is obtained with a first-order optimal number of key bits
logK = (1 + ρ)
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0) [DQ −DP ]
+n
1
2 , (23)
1See also the discussion in [10, Appendix A].
5where ρ > 0 can be arbitrarily small and DQ = D(Q1‖Q0). In addition,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
logM∗D(n, , δ)√
n
=
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)DP . (24)
Theorem 2. For  ∈]0, 1[ and δ ∈]0, 1[, let Γ , Q−1( 1−δ2 ). We have
logM *V (n, , δ) 6
2ΓDP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 −
√
2ΓVP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1()n
1
4 +O(log n), (25)
and
logM *V (n, , δ) >
2ΓDP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 −
(√
2ΓVP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1() +
2
√
pie
Γ2
2 DP√
Γχ2(Q1‖Q0) 14
)
n
1
4 +O(log n), (26)
where DP and VP are as in (22). This number of message bits is obtained with a number of key bits
logK = (1 + ρ)
2ΓDP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
[DQ −DP ]+n 12 , (27)
where ρ > 0 can be arbitrarily small. In addition,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
logM∗V (n, , δ)√
n
=
2ΓDP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
. (28)
Theorem 3. For  ∈]0, 1[, α ∈]0, 1[, and δ ∈]0, 1− α[, let Λ , Q−1(1− α− δ) and Υ , Q−1(α). We have
logM *β(n, , δ, α) 6
(Λ + Υ)DP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 −
√
(Λ + Υ)VP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1()n
1
4 +O(log n), (29)
and
logM *β(n, , δ, α) >
(Λ + Υ)DP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 −
√ (Λ + Υ)VP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1() +
√
2pi
(
e
Γ2
2 + e
Υ2
2
)
DP
√
Λ + Υχ2(Q1‖Q0) 14
n 14 +O(log n). (30)
This number of message bits is obtained with a number of key bits
logK = (1 + ρ)
(Λ + Υ)[DQ −DP ]+√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 , (31)
where ρ > 0 can be arbitrarily small. In addition,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
logM∗β(n, , δ, α)√
n
=
(Λ + Υ)DP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
. (32)
We point out that the second order asymptotics in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are loose because the parameters Γ, Λ, and
Υ may be very small; in particular, because of the inequalities (20), Theorem 1 is sometimes a tighter lower bound for small
values of n. We conjecture that the upper-bounds in (25) and (29) can be achieved, although we could not establish it with
our current proof techniques.
We illustrate the results of the three theorems with a simple numerical example. We consider the situation in which
(X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z) are Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs) with cross-over probability pm = 0.11 and pw =
0.45, respectively, and  = 10−3, δ = 10−2, and α = 0.2. Since the convergence to the asymptotic limit is slow (on the
order of Θ(n−
1
4 )), we use a log scale for the blocklength. As shown in Fig. 2, the choice of the covertness metric results in
different number of bits, which of course raises the question of which number to settle on. We argue that M∗V (n, , δ) is the
number to focus on since total variation distance satisfies two desirable properties: it is directly related to the performance of
the adversary’s detector through the inequality α + β > 1 − V(P̂Z, Q⊗n0 ) and it does not presume any knowledge about the
exact operating point on the adversary’s ROC curve.
Before we detail the achievability and converse proofs in the next sections, we provide here a high-level sketch of the
proofs. Following [10], the coding scheme in the achievability proof consists of MK randomly generated codewords xsw with
s ∈ J1,KK and w ∈ J1,MK. The code is designed such that the following two properties hold:
(P1) any “large” enough subset of codebook {xsw}(s,w)∈J1,KK×J1,MK forms a resolvability code for the channel (X ,WZ|X ,Z)
approximating Q⊗n0 ;
6Fig. 2. Second-order approximation of maximum number of covert and reliable bits as a function of blocklength. Both DMCs are BSCs with cross-over
probability pm = 0.11 and pw = 0.45, respectively, and  = 10−3, δ = 10−2, and α = 0.2. The dotted horizontal lines indicate the optimal first-order
asymptotics.
(P2) for every s ∈ J1,KK, the sub-codebook {xsw}w∈J1,MK forms a reliability code for the channel (X ,WY |X ,Y) with a
maximum probability of error .
The analysis does not follow from standard arguments for two reasons. First, we resort to PPM codes [16] to obtain the optimal
second-order asymptotics for relative entropy. Second, one cannot ensure (P1) and (P2) by merely expurgating some of the
sub-codebooks, since this expurgation may change the output distribution on Zn induced by the code; we address this by
carefully analyzing the probability of error and using concentration of measure results. The converse proof adapts arguments
from [18] after showing how the covertness constraint leads to an upper bound for the average codeword weight.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS WITH GENERIC COVERTNESS QUASI-METRIC
We now develop results for a generic covertness metric, which will be specialized to the three metrics highlighted in
Definition 1 in Section IV-A, Section IV-B, and Section IV-C. This organization allows us to separately handle the part of the
analysis that solely depends on the code structure and not on the exact metric choice. Specifically, throughout this section,
we consider an arbitrary quasi-metric d measuring the distance between distributions. The quasi-metric d does not necessarily
possess the standard characteristics of a metric; however, we assume that it is non-negative and satisfies a modified triangle
inequality, i.e.,
• ∀P,Q : d(P,Q) > 0
• ∀P,Q,R : d(R,Q) 6 d(P,Q) + D(R‖P ) +√D(R‖P ) max(1, log 1minx:Q(x)>0 Q(x)).
This modified version of the triangle inequality is intimately linked to the relative entropy, and is used mainly for convenience;
this will avoid repetitions when we study different metrics and should not be given much operational significance. In brief, we
will use the modified triangle inequality as follows: we will pick an appropriate distribution P such that d(R,Q) is essentially
on the order of d(P,Q) that depends on d, while the remaining terms that depend on relative entropy will be made negligible.
We define an (M,K, n, , δ)d covert code and M∗d (n, , δ) for a covert communication channel (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z) as in
Definition 1.
Our proof for a generic covertness quasi-metric d is organized as follows. In Section III-A, we start by developing one-shot
results for random codes to bound the average probability of error (Lemma 1) and the approximation of output statistics
as measured with the quasi-metric (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3). The expurgation of the code requires some care because of
the interplay between reliability and channel resolvability (Lemma 4). In Section III-B, we specialize the one-shot results to
obtain an achievability result for random codes with large-enough blocklength (Theorem 5). In Section III-C, we refine the
statement of Theorem 5 for the specific random code ensemble consisting of PPM codes. This requires the study of the specific
quantities involved in the statement of Theorem 5 (Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 7). We also pave the way for our final results
by developing bounds between the output distribution induced by a PPM ensemble and the innocent distribution for relative
entropy, variational distance, and probability of missed-detection (Lemma 8). These bounds are fairly technical and rely on
moment bounds (Lemma 16). Finally, in Section III-D, we develop a general converse (Theorem 7).
7A. One-shot achievability analysis
We develop one-shot random coding results for codes simultaneously ensuring channel reliability and channel resolvability.
Given a DMC(X ,WY |X ,Y) and a codebook with M codewords x1, · · · , xM ∈ X ,2 our analysis of reliability is based on a
threshold decoder [18] operating as follows. Given γ > 0 and a distribution QY on Y , and upon observing y, the decoder
forms the estimate Ŵ = w of the transmitted message W if there exists a unique w ∈ J1,MK such that
log
WY |X(y|xw)
QY (y)
> γ. (33)
If there is no w satisfying (33), the decoder declares an error. It is known [18] that the conditional probability of error when
W = w is upper bounded by (1)w + 
(2)
w where
(1)w ,
∑
y
WY |X(y|xw)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw)
QY (y)
6 γ
}
= FXY |QYX=xw(γ), (34)
(2)w ,
∑
y
WY |X(y|xw)1
{
∃w′ 6= w : log WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
. (35)
Under random coding, (1)1 , · · · , (1)w are independent, and we can therefore bound their average using well-known concentration
inequalities. The following lemma upper bounds the expectation of (1)w and 
(2)
w .
Lemma 1. Let (X ,WY |X ,Y) be a DMC and PX and QY be two distributions on X and Y . Assume that PY  QY . If we
choose X1, · · · , XM independently according to PX , we have for all γ ∈ R and w ∈ J1,MK
E
(
(1)w
)
= FXY |QY (γ), (36)
E
(
(2)w
)
6 M
exp(γ)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
)
. (37)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of [10, Lemma 3] or [18, Theorem 18], but for completeness we provide the
short proof. We know that
E
(
(1)w
)
=
∑
x1,··· ,xM
M∏
k=1
PX(xk)
∑
y
WY |X(y|xw)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw)
QY (y)
6 γ
}
(38)
=
∑
xw,y
PX(xw)WY |X(y|xw)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw)
QY (y)
6 γ
}
(39)
= PWY |XPX
(
log
WY |X(Y |X)
QY (Y )
6 γ
)
(40)
= FXY |QY (γ). (41)
Moreover, we have
E
(
(2)w
)
6
∑
x1,··· ,xM
M∏
k=1
PX(xk)
∑
y
WY |X(y|xw)1
{
∃w′ 6= w : log WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(42)
6
∑
x1,··· ,xM
M∏
k=1
PX(xk)
∑
y
WY |X(y|xw)
∑
w′ 6=w
1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(43)
=
∑
w′ 6=w
∑
x1,··· ,xM ,y
WY |X(y|xw)
M∏
k=1
PX(xk)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(44)
=
∑
w′ 6=w
∑
xw′ ,y
PY (y)PX(xw′)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(45)
=
∑
w′ 6=w
∑
xw′ ,y
QY (y)
PY (y)
QY (y)
PX(xw′)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(46)
2Since we are deriving one-shot bounds, X can be arbitrary in this section.
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∑
w′ 6=w
∑
xw′ ,y
exp(−γ)WY |X(y|xw′) PY (y)
QY (y)
PX(xw′)1
{
log
WY |X(y|xw′)
QY (y)
> γ
}
(47)
6 M
exp(γ)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
)
. (48)
Remark 3. In a second-order analysis, γ is generally chosen such that E
(

(1)
w
)
dominates E
(

(2)
w
)
; we follow this approach
as well, which is convenient since we have some flexibility in the bounding of E
(

(1)
w
)
.
Remark 4. The extra factor EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
)
in (37), which does not appear in [18, Theorem 18], is the penalty of using QY
instead of the “true” probability distribution of Y , PY , in the definition of FXY |QY . This sub-optimal bound yields the same
first- and second-order asymptotics for covert communications, although it could certainly be improved for a finite-length
analysis; this choice , however, simplifies our calculations.
Next, we develop one-shot channel resolvability results. In our proofs, we treat the distance between induced output
distribution and the desired distribution as a function of independently generated codewords, which allows us to prove a
super-exponential concentration inequality in Lemma 2 using McDiarmid’s Theorem. This may be viewed as an alternative
and more direct approach to [20] and we recall this concentration inequality below for convenience.
Theorem 4 (McDiarmid’s Theorem). Let X , (X1, · · · , Xn) be a sequence of independent random variables defined on X .
Furthermore, suppose g : Xn → R is a function satisfying
sup
x1,··· ,xn,x′i
|g(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xn)− g(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xn)| 6 ci, ∀i ∈ J1, nK. (49)
Then, for all λ > 0, we have
P(g(X)− E(g(X)) > λ) 6 exp
(−2λ2∑
c2i
)
. (50)
Proof: See [21, Theorem 2.2.2].
Lemma 2. Consider a DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) and a distribution PX on X . If {xw}Mw=1 ∈ XM are M > 2 codewords3 and
P̂Z(z), 1M
∑M
w=1WZ|X(x|xw) is the corresponding induced distribution on Z , we define the functions g1, g2 : XM → R as
g1(x1, · · · , xM ) , V
(
P̂Z , PZ
)
, (51)
and
g2(x1, · · · , xM ) , D
(
P̂Z‖PZ
)
, (52)
with PZ(z) =
∑
x PX(x)WZ|X(z|x). Then, for all x1, · · · , xM , x′i ∈ X , we have
|g1(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xM )− g1(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xM )| 6
1
M
, (53)
and
|g2(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xM )− g2(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xM )| 6
1
M
log
(
M |Z|
µ2Z
)
. (54)
Moreover, if X1, · · · , XM are i.i.d. with distribution PX , then
P
(
V
(
P̂Z , PZ
)
− E
(
V
(
P̂Z , PZ
))
> λ
)
6 exp
(−2Mλ2) , (55)
and
P
(
D
(
P̂Z‖PZ
)
− E
(
D
(
P̂Z‖PZ
))
> λ
)
6 exp
− 2Mλ2
log2
(
M |Z|
µ2Z
)
 . (56)
3Unlike the main problem in which we have MK codewords, we denote here the total number of codewords by M for simplicity.
9Proof: We assume that P̂ 1Z and P̂
2
Z are the distributions induced by the codebooks C1 , {x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xM} and
C2 , {x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xM}, respectively. First, note that
g1(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xM )− g1(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xM ) = V
(
P̂ 1Z , PZ
)
− V
(
P̂ 2Z , PZ
)
(57)
6 V
(
P̂ 1Z , P̂
2
Z
)
(58)
=
1
2
∑
z
∣∣∣P̂ 1Z(z)− P̂ 2Z(z)∣∣∣ (59)
=
1
2
∑
z
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ∑
x∈C1
WZ|X(z|x)− 1
M
∑
x∈C2
WZ|X(z|x)
∣∣∣∣∣ (60)
=
1
2M
∑
z
∣∣WZ|X(z|xi)−WZ|X(z|x′i)∣∣ (61)
=
1
M
V
(
WZ|X(.|xi),WZ|X(.|x′i)
)
(62)
6 1
M
. (63)
Next, for any two distributions P and Q, by [22, Lemma 2.7], we have
|H(P )−H(Q)| 6 −V(P,Q) log V(P,Q)|X | . (64)
Therefore, we have ∣∣∣H(P̂ 1Z)−H(P̂ 2Z)∣∣∣ 6 −V(P̂ 1Z , P̂ 2Z) log V
(
P̂ 1Z , P̂
2
Z
)
|Z| (65)
(a)
6 − 1
M
log
1
M |Z| (66)
=
1
M
log (M |Z|) , (67)
where (a) follows from the fact that x log(|Z| /x) is increasing for 0 < x < |Z| /e. Accordingly, we obtain∣∣∣D(P̂ 1Z‖PZ)− D(P̂ 2Z‖PZ)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−H(P̂ 1Z) +∑
z
P̂ 1Z(z) log
1
PZ(z)
+H(P̂ 2Z)−
∑
z
P̂ 2Z(z) log
1
PZ(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ (68)
6 1
M
log (M |Z|) +
∑
z
∣∣∣P̂ 1Z(z)− P̂ 2Z(z)∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣log 1PZ(z)
∣∣∣∣ (69)
6 1
M
log (M |Z|) + 2
M
log
1
µZ
(70)
=
1
M
log
(
M |Z|
µ2Z
)
. (71)
Finally, using Theorem 4, we obtain (55) and (56).
The following lemma bounds the expected value of the relative entropy appearing in Lemma 2. The result has appeared
in the case of i.i.d. distributions in [15] and we provide here a one-shot result better-suited for covert communications and
non-i.i.d. distributions.
Lemma 3. Let (X ,WZ|X ,Z) be a DMC and PX be a distribution on X . If X1, · · · , XM are i.i.d. with distribution PX , and
P̂Z(z), 1M
∑M
w=1WZ|X(z,Xw) is the corresponding induced distribution on Z , we have
E
(
D
(
P̂Z‖PZ
))
6 log
(
1
µZ
+ 1
)
FXZ(γ) +
exp(γ)
M
, (72)
for all γ ∈ R where PZ(z) =
∑
x PX(x)WZ|X(z|x).
Proof: From [23, Equation 10], we know that
E
(
D
(
P̂Z‖PZ
))
6 EWZ|XPX
(
log
(
WZ|X(Z|X)
MPZ(Z)
+ 1
))
. (73)
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If we define the event E ,
{
(x, z) : log
WZ|X(z|x))
PZ(z)
6 γ
}
, then we get
E
(
log
(
WZ|X(Z|X)
MPZ(Z)
+ 1
))
= E
(
log
(
WZ|X(Z|X)
MPZ(Z)
+ 1
) ∣∣∣∣∣E
)
P(E) + E
(
log
(
WZ|X(Z|X)
MPZ(Z)
+ 1
) ∣∣∣∣∣Ec
)
P(Ec) (74)
6 log
(
exp(γ)
M
+ 1
)
+ FXZ(γ) log
(
1
µZ
+ 1
)
(75)
6 exp(γ)
M
+ FXZ(γ) log
(
1
µZ
+ 1
)
. (76)
Consider now the DMC (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z) and a randomly generated code {Xsw : s ∈ J1,KK, w ∈ J1,MK}. The next
lemma leverages Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to guarantee that, with positive probability, the entire code is a channel resolvability
code for the channel WZ|X and, simultaneously, the subcode corresponding to every s ∈ J1,KK is a channel reliability code
for the channel WY |X . Note that a code with these properties is not necessarily a covert code, but we show in the next sections
how a careful choice of the random coding distribution leads to covertness.
Lemma 4. Consider a DMC (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z) and two probability distributions PX and QY on X and Y . We sample
codewords {Xsw : s ∈ J1,KK, w ∈ J1,MK} independently according to PX . For s ∈ J1,KK and w ∈ J1,MK, let (1)sw and

(2)
sw be defined similar to (34) and (35). Moreover, for a fixed subset I ⊂ J1,KK× J1,MK, we define the induced distribution
by the codewords in I as P̂ IZ (z) , 1|I|
∑
(s,w)∈IWZ|X(z|Xsw). The quantities (1)sw , (2)sw , and D
(
P̂ IZ‖PZ
)
will be treated as
random variables with respect to the randomness of the random code. Finally, for every λ1, λ2, λ3, γ1, and γ2 > 0, we define
the events
E1 ,
{
max
sw
(1)sw 6 max
x∈suppPX
FXY |QYX=x(γ1) and maxs
1
M
M∑
w=1
(2)sw 6 λ2
M
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
)}
(77)
and
E2 ,
{
∀I ⊂ J1,KK× J1,MK with |I| = λ1MK,D(P̂ IZ‖PZ) 6 log( 1µZ + 1
)
FXZ(γ2) +
exp(γ2)
λ1MK
+ λ3
}
. (78)
Then P(E1 ∩ E2) > 0 if
1 > exp
−M
 2λ1λ23
log2
(
λ1MK|Z|
µ2Z
) +Hb (λ1)
+ 1
λ2
. (79)
Proof: We analyze the probability of each event separately. First, note that
P(E1) = P
(
max
sw
(1)sw 6 max
x∈suppPX
FXY |QYX=x(γ1) and maxs
1
M
M∑
w=1
(2)sw 6 λ2
M
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
))
(80)
(a)
= P
(
max
s
1
M
M∑
w=1
(2)sw 6 λ2
M
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
))
(81)
(b)
=
(
1− P
(
1
M
M∑
w=1

(2)
1w > λ2
M
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY (Y )
QY (Y )
)))K
(82)
(c)
>
(
1− 1
λ2
)K
, (83)
where (a) follows since by (34), maxsw 
(1)
sw 6 maxx∈suppPX FXY |QYX=x(γ1) holds almost surely, (b) follows since all
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sub-codebooks are generated independently, and (c) follows from Markov inequality and Lemma 1. Furthermore, we have
P(E2) = P
(
∀I ⊂ J1,KK× J1,MK with |I| = λ1MK,D(P̂ IZ‖PZ) 6 log( 1µZ + 1
)
FXZ(γ2)
+
exp(γ2)
λ1MK
+ λ3
)
(84)
> 1−
∑
I⊂J1,KK×J1,MK:|I|=λ1MK
P
(
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PZ
)
> log
(
1
µZ
+ 1
)
FXZ(γ2) +
exp(γ2)
λ1MK
+ λ3
)
(85)
(a)
> 1−
∑
I⊂J1,KK×J1,MK:|I|=λ1MK
P
(
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PZ
)
> E
(
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PZ
))
+ λ3
)
(86)
(b)
> 1−
(
MK
λ1MK
)
exp
− 2MKλ1λ23
log2
(
λ1MK|Z|
µ2Z
)
 (87)
(c)
> 1− exp (MKHb (λ1)) exp
− 2MKλ1λ23
log2
(
λ1MK|Z|
µ2Z
)
 , (88)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3, (b) follows from Lemma 2, and (c) follows from
(
MK
λ1MK
)
6 exp (MKHb (λ1)). Combining
these inequalities, we get
P(E1) + P(E2) >
(
1− 1
λ2
)K
+ 1− exp (MKHb (λ1)) exp
− 2MKλ1λ23
log2
(
λ1MK|Z|
µ2Z
)
 . (89)
Thus, we obtain
P(E1 ∩ E2) = 1− P(Ec1 ∪ Ec2) (90)
> 1− P(Ec1)− PC(Ec2) (91)
= P(E1) + P(E2)− 1 (92)
(a)
>
(
1− 1
λ2
)K
− exp (MKHb (λ1)) exp
− 2MKλ23
log2
(
MK|Z|
µ2Z
)
 , (93)
where (a) follows from (89). Finally, (79) ensures that the RHS of (93) is positive.
B. Asymptotic results for covert communications
We specialize the one-shot result of Lemma 4 to show the existence of covert codes for large blocklength n.
Theorem 5. Consider a sequence of distributions {PnX }n>1 where PnX is defined on Xn and two sequences of natural numbers
{Mn}n>1 and {Kn}n>1. For a quasi-metric d and n large enough, if we have
1− exp
−Mn
 2(1− n−11)
n8 log2
(
MnKn|Z|n
(1−n−11)µ2nZ
) −Hb (n−11)
− 1
n
> 0, (94)
max
x∈suppPnX
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x(n
13 logMn) +
1
n
EPY
(
PY(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
6 , (95)
FXZ
(
log
MnKn
n4
)
6 n−6, (96)
and
d(PZ, Q
⊗n
0 ) 6 δ − n−
1
2 , (97)
then M∗d (n, , δ) >Mn.
Theorem 5 is useful in that it identifies sufficient conditions for the existence of codes. In particular, subsequent achievability
proofs are reduced to choosing an appropriate sequence of random coding distributions {PnX }n>1 and verifying inequalities (94)-
(97). We will use a PPM distribution, which we introduce and analyze precisely in Section III-C.
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Proof: For a fixed n, we choose codewords Xsw for s ∈ J1,KnK and w ∈ J1,MnK independently according to PnX . In
Lemma 4, if we set
λ1 = 1− n−11, λ2 = n, , λ3 = n−4, , γ1 = log
(
n13Mn
)
, and γ2 = log
MnKn
n4
, (98)
then (94) implies (79) for large n. Therefore, we have with positive probability for n large enough,
max
s,w
(1)sw 6 max
x∈suppPnX
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x(γ1), (99)
max
s
1
Mn
Mn∑
w=1
(2)sw 6 λ2
Mn
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
, (100)
where (99) follows from (34) with QY = P ⊗n0 . Also, for all I ⊂ J1,KnK × J1,MnK with |I| = λ1MnKn and with µZ ,
minz PZ(z), we have for large enough n
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PZ
)
6 log
(
1 +
1
µZ
)
FXZ(γ2) +
exp(γ2)
λ1MnKn
+ λ3 (101)
(a)
6 n log
(
1 +
1
µZ
)
1
n6
+
1
n4
+
1
n4
6 3
n4
, (102)
where (a) follows from (96) and the choice of γ2, λ3. We next expurgate the (1−λ1)Mn codewords with largest (2)sw for all s
from the sub-codebook {Xsw : w ∈ J1,MnK} to form a new codebook I with |I| = λ1MnKn. For the new code, by Markov
inequality, we have
max
s,w
(2)sw 6
1
1− λ1λ2
Mn
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
. (103)
Hence, the maximum probability of error for the expurgated code is bounded by
max
s,w
((1)sw + 
(2)
sw ) 6 max
x∈suppPnX
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x(γ1) +
1
1− λ1λ2
Mn
exp(γ1)
EPY
(
PY(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
(104)
= max
x∈suppPnX
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x(γ1) +
1
n
EPY
(
PY(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
6 . (105)
Finally, to prove the covertness of the code, note that for n large enough
d(P̂ IZ , Q
⊗n
0 )
(a)
6 d(PnZ , Q⊗n0 ) + D
(
P̂ IZ‖PnZ
)
+
√
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PnZ
)
max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q⊗n0 (z)>0Q
⊗n
0 (z)
)
(106)
(b)
6 δ − 1√
n
+ D
(
P̂ IZ‖PnZ
)
+
√
D
(
P̂ IZ‖PnZ
)
max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q⊗n0 (z)>0Q
⊗n
0 (z)
)
(107)
(c)
6 δ − 1√
n
+
3
n4
+
√
3
n4
max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q⊗n0 (z)>0Q
⊗n
0 (z)
)
(108)
6 δ − 1√
n
+
3
n4
+
√
3
n4
max
(
1, n log
1
µZ
)
(109)
6 δ, (110)
where (a) follows because d is a quasi-metric, (b) follows from (97), and (c) follows from (102).
C. PPM distribution
We now study the specific “PPM distribution,” which was used in [16] for covert communication; we subsequently use this
distribution to generate random codes and combine with Theorem 5. The choice of PPM is crucial to evaluate (95).
Definition 2 ((n, `)-PPM covert distribution). Given X = {0, 1} and n > ` > 1, we define the distribution Pn,`X,PPM on Xn as
follows. If n = m`+ r for 0 6 r < `, we partition the set J1, nK into ` sets of size m and one set of size r. For simplicity, we
consider the following partition: Bi = {(i− 1)m+ 1, · · · , im} for i ∈ J1, `K and B`+1 = {`m+ 1, · · · , n}. Then, Pn,`X,PPM is
the uniform distribution on the sequences with exactly one “1” in all Bi for i ∈ J1, `K and no “1” in B`+1, i.e.,x ∈ Xn : ∀i ∈ J1, `K : ∑
j∈Bi
xj = 1 and
∑
j∈B`+1
xj = 0
 . (111)
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We denote the output distribution of Pn,`X,PPM for DMCs (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z) by Pn,`Y,PPM and Pn,`Z,PPM, respectively.
The PPM covert distribution Pn,`X,PPM may be viewed as a way to generate structured constant composition codewords;
specifically, every codeword generated according to Pn,`X,PPM contains exactly ` 1-symbols, each located in a window of size
m, the quotient of the Euclidean division of n by `. The structure of the PPM covert distribution plays a pivotal role in our
analysis.
We devote the remainder of this section to the development of properties of PPM distribution, which are geared towards the
use of Theorem 5. We make repeated use of the Berry-Esseen Theorem, which we recall here for convenience.
Theorem 6 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables s.t. for k ∈ J1, nK we have E(Xk) =
µk, σ2k = Var(Xk), and tk = E
(|Xk − µk|3). If we define σ2 = ∑nk=1 σ2k and T = ∑nk=1 tk, then we have∣∣∣∣∣P
(
n∑
k=1
(Xk − µk) > λσ
)
−Q(λ)
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 6Tσ3 . (112)
We now upper bound the left-hand-side (l.h.s.) of (95) for the PPM distribution in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Lemma 5. Let (X ,WY |X ,Y) be a binary-input DMC. If (X,Y) is distributed according to Pn,`X,PPMW ⊗nY |X , we have
max
x∈suppPn,`X,PPM
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x(γ) 6 Q
(
`DP − γ√
`VP
)
+
6TP√
`V
3
2
P
, (113)
with
TP , EP1
(∣∣∣∣log P1(Y )P0(Y ) − D(P1‖P0)
∣∣∣∣3
)
. (114)
Proof: For a sequence x0 with P
n,`
X,PPM(x0) > 0, we can assume without loss of generality that the support of x0 is J1, `K
since the channel is memoryless and by relabeling. Hence, we have
FXY|P ⊗n0 X=x0(γ) = PW ⊗nY |X=x0
(
log
W ⊗nY |X(Y|x0)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
6 γ|X = x0
)
(115)
= PP ⊗`1
(∑`
i=1
log
P1(Yi)
P0(Yi)
6 γ
)
(116)
(a)
6 Q
(
`DP − γ√
`VP
)
+
6TP√
`V
3
2
P
, (117)
where (a) follows from Theorem 6.
Lemma 6. For a binary-input DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y), we have
EPn,`Y,PPM
(
Pn,`Y,PPM(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
=
(
1 +
χ2(P1‖P0)
bn/`c
)`
(118)
6 exp
(
`(`+ 1)
n
χ2(P1‖P0)
)
. (119)
Proof: To prove (118), we define m , bn/`c. We first consider Pm,1X,PPM for which we have
EPm,1Y,PPM
(
Pm,1Y,PPM(Y)
P ⊗m0 (Y)
)
=
∑
y
Pm,1Y,PPM(y)
Pm,1Y,PPM(y)
P ⊗m0 (y)
(120)
=
∑
y
P ⊗m0 (y)
(
Pm,1Y,PPM(y)
P ⊗m0 (y)
)2
(121)
=
∑
y
P ⊗m0 (y)
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
P1(yi)
P0(yi)
)2
(122)
=
1
m2
(m(m− 1) +m(χ2(P1‖P0) + 1)) (123)
= 1 +
χ2(P1‖P0)
m
. (124)
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Since Pn,`Y,PPM is the product of the distributions over different blocks, i.e., P
n,`
Y,PPM =
(
Pm,1Y,PPM
)⊗`⊗P ⊗n mod `0 , upon defining
Yi = (Y(i−1)m+1, · · · , Yim) for i ∈ J1, `K, we obtain
EPn,`Y,PPM
(
Pn,`Y,PPM(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
= E
(Pm,1Y,PPM)
⊗`
(∏`
i=1
Pm,1Y,PPM(Yi)
P ⊗m0 (Yi)
)
(125)
=
∏`
i=1
EPm,1Y,PPM
(
Pm,1Y,PPM(Yi)
P ⊗m0 (Yi)
)
(126)
=
(
1 +
χ2(P1‖P0)
m
)`
(127)
6 exp
(
`(`+ 1)
n
χ2(P1‖P0)
)
. (128)
We now upper-bound the l.h.s. of (96) in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Given a binary-input DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z), if (X,Z) is distributed according to Pn,`X,PPMW ⊗nZ|X , then, for γ > `DQ,
we have
FXZ(γ) 6 exp
(
− (γ − `DQ)
2
2` log2 µZ
)
. (129)
Proof: When (X,Z) is distributed according to Pn,`X,PPMW
⊗n
Z|X , for the random vector Z ∈ Zn, the first ` blocks of length
m , bn/`c are denoted by Z1, · · · ,Z` with Zi = (Z(i−1)m+1, · · · , Zim). Moreover, PZi denotes the distribution of block Zi.
Therefore, we have
FXZ(γ) = PPn,`X,PPMW ⊗nZ|X
(
log
W ⊗nZ|X(Z|X)
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
> γ
)
(130)
= PPn,`X,PPMW ⊗nZ|X
(∑`
i=1
log
W ⊗mZ|X(Zi|Xi)
PZi(Zi)
> γ
)
(131)
(a)
6 exp
−2
(
γ − `I(Pm,1X,PPM,W ⊗mZ|X)
)2
`B2
 , (132)
where (a) follows from Hoeffding’s Inequality with
B , sup
xi,zi
∣∣∣∣∣log W
⊗m
Z|X(zi|xi)
PZi(zi)
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0 (133)
and I(Pm,1X,PPM,W
⊗m
Z|X) is defined as in (6). By [16, Lemma 1.5], we know that I(P
m,1
X,PPM,W
⊗m
Z|X) 6 DQ and B 6 logm for
m large enough.4 Hence, we obtain
exp
−2
(
γ − `I(Pm,1X,PPM,W ⊗mZ|X)
)2
`B2
 6 exp(− (γ − `DQ)2
` log2m
)
. (134)
Finally, we upper-bound the l.h.s. of (97) using Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. Let (X ,WZ|X ,Z) be a DMC, and n and ` be positive integers with m , bn/`c large enough and ` = Θ(m).
Then, we have
D
(
Pn,`Z,PPM‖Q⊗n0
)
6 `
2
2n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) +O
(
1√
n
)
. (135)
4The bound for B corrects a small oversight with no incidence on the result in [16].
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Furthermore, we have
V
(
Pn,`Z,PPM, Q
⊗n
0
)
6 1− 2Q
(
`
2
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
)
+
2√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
, (136)
βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P
n,`
Z,PPM
)
> Q
(
`
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
−Q−1
(
α+
1√
`
))
− 1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (137)
Proof: By [16, Lemma 1], we have for n large enough and some positive constant C1, C2, C3, and C4,
D
(
Pn,`Z,PPM‖Q⊗n0
)
6 `
2m
χ2(Q1‖Q0) + `C1
m2
+
`C2
m3
(138)
6 `
2m
χ2(Q1‖Q0) + `C3
m2
(139)
6 `
2(n/`− 1)χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
`C3
(n/`− 1)2 (140)
6 `
2
2n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) + `
3C4
n2
. (141)
To prove (136), note that for any two distributions P and Q, one can write V(P,Q) = PP (P (X) > Q(X))−PQ(P (X) > Q(X)).
Therefore, if Z = (Z1, · · · , Zn) and Z˜ = (Z˜1, · · · , Z˜n) are distributed according to Q⊗n0 and Pn,`Z,PPM, respectively, then
V
(
Pn,`Z,PPM, Q
⊗n
0
)
= P
(
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z˜) > Q
⊗n
0 (Z˜)
)
− P
(
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z) > Q
⊗n
0 (Z)
)
(142)
= P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z˜)
Q⊗n0 (Z˜)
> 0
)
− P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> 0
)
. (143)
However, note that Pn,⊗`Z,PPM = (P
m,1
Z,PPM)
` ⊗Q⊗r0 , and for any z = (z1, · · · , zn) with zi = (z(i−1)m+1, · · · , zim), we have
log
(
Pn,`Z,PPM(z)
Q⊗n0 (z)
)
=
∑`
i=1
log
(
Pm,1Z,PPM(zi)
Q⊗m0 (zi)
)
(144)
=
∑`
i=1
log
(∑m
j=1
1
mQ1(z(i−1)m+j)
∏
k 6=j Q0(z(i−1)m+k)
Q⊗m0 (zi)
)
(145)
=
∑`
i=1
log
 1
m
m∑
j=1
Q1(z(i−1)m+j)
Q0(z(i−1)m+j)
 (146)
=
∑`
i=1
log
1 + 1
m
m∑
j=1
Q1(z(i−1)m+j)−Q0(z(i−1)m+j)
Q0(z(i−1)m+j)
 (147)
=
∑`
i=1
log
1 + 1
m
m∑
j=1
A(z(i−1)m+j)
, (148)
for A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z) . Thus, if we define
Bi ,
1
m
m∑
j=1
A(Z(i−1)m+j) (149)
Ci , log(1 +Bi) (150)
B˜i ,
1
m
m∑
j=1
A(Z˜(i−1)m+j) (151)
C˜i , log(1 + B˜i). (152)
Then, we have
P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z˜)
Q⊗n0 (Z˜)
> 0
)
− P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> 0
)
= P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
)
− P
(∑`
i=1
Ci > 0
)
. (153)
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Furthermore, we consider two i.i.d. sequences B1, · · · , B` and B˜1, · · · , B˜` with distribution
P(Bi = b) , P(Bi = b|Bi 6= −1) (154)
P
(
B˜i = b
)
, P
(
B˜i = b|B˜i 6= −1
)
. (155)
Note that with τ , P(A(Z1) = −1) < 1, we have P(Bi = −1) = τm. By defining Ci , log(1 +Bi) and C˜i , log(1 + B˜i),
we will deal with random variables that take finite values with probability one. We now replace C˜i by C˜i, and since C˜1, · · · C˜`
are i.i.d., we apply Theorem 6 to obtain
P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
)
= P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
∣∣∀i, B˜i 6= −1)P(∀i, B˜i 6= −1)
+ P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
∣∣∃i : B˜i = −1)P(∃i : B˜i = −1) (156)
6 P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
∣∣∀i, B˜i 6= −1)+ `τm (157)
= P
(∑`
i=1
C˜i > 0
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
(158)
6 Q
 −
∑`
i=1 E
(
C˜i
)
√
`
∑`
i=1 Var
(
C˜i
)
+
∑`
i=1 E
(∣∣∣C˜i − E(C˜i)∣∣∣3)(∑`
i=1 Var
(
C˜i
)) 3
2
(159)
(a)
6 Q
− `
(
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m +O
(
1
m2
))√
`
(
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m +O
(
1
m2
))
+ `
(
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
3
2
m
3
2
+O
(
1
m
9
4
))
(
`
(
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m +O
(
1
m2
))) 32 (160)
= Q
(
−1
2
√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
)
+
1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
, (161)
where (a) follows from Lemma 16 in Appendix B. Analogously, using Lemma 16 we obtain
P
(∑`
i=1
Ci > 0
)
> Q
(
1
2
√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
)
− 1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
, (162)
and therefore, we have (136).
To lower-bound βα(Q⊗n0 , P
n,`
Z,PPM), we use the Neyman-Pearson lemma, which states that if α 6 P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> γ
)
for
some γ, then we have βα(Q⊗n0 , P
n,`
Z,PPM) > P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z˜)
Q⊗n0 (Z˜)
6 γ
)
where Z and Z˜ are defined as before. Using Theorem 6
again, similar to (162), we obtain
P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
> γ
)
> Q
γ + `χ2(Q1‖Q0)2m√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
− 1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (163)
Accordingly, to ensure that P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z)
Q⊗n0 (Z)
6 γ
)
> α, we choose γ =
√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m Q
−1
(
α+ 1√
`
)
− `χ2(Q1‖Q0)2m +O
(
1√
n
)
.
Thus, we have
βα(Q
⊗n
0 , P
n,`
Z,PPM) > P
(
log
Pn,`Z,PPM(Z˜)
Q⊗n0 (Z˜)
6
√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
Q−1
(
α+
1√
`
)
− `χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1√
n
))
(164)
> Q
−
√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m Q
−1
(
α+ 1√
`
)
+ `χ2(Q1‖Q0)2m +
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
− 1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
(165)
= Q
(√
`χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
−Q−1
(
α+
1√
`
))
− 1√
`
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (166)
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D. Converse
We now develop a generic converse for a quasi-metric d. The following result states that the number of covert and reliable
bits that one can transmit may be characterized by establishing an upper bound on the weight of codewords. Such upper bounds
are metric-specific, and we develop them in Section IV.
Theorem 7. Let d be a quasi-metric and (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z) be a DMC. If there exists a function g : R→ R such that
for every (M,K, n, , δ)d code C, there exists a subset of the codewords, D, with
maxx∈D wt(x)√
n
6 g(δ) + C√
n
, (167)
and |D| > MK
nh
where C, h > 0 only depend on the channel, then
logM∗d (n, , δ) 6 g(δ)DPn
1
2 −
√
g(δ)VPQ
−1()n
1
4 +O(log n). (168)
In addition, if for every (Mn,Kn, n, , δ)d code in a sequence {Cn} of increasing length n such that limn→∞ n = 0, there
exists a non-empty subset of codewords Dn ⊂ Cn with
maxx∈Dn wt(x)√
n
6 g(δ) + o(1), and log MnKn|Dn| = o
(√
n
)
. (169)
Then,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
logM∗d (n, , δ)√
n
= g(δ). (170)
Proof: Let C be an (M,K, n, , δ)d code. For s ∈ J1,KK, we denote the sub-codebook of all codewords characterized by
the key value s by Cs. By our assumptions, we can choose D ⊂ C of size at least MK/nh satisfying (167). By the pigeonhole
principle, there should be at least one sub-codebook Cs such that |D ∩ Cs| >M/nh. Let us define
Dsi , {x ∈ D ∩ Cs : wt(x) = i}. (171)
Since Dsi is included in Cs, it is a reliability code for the channel WY |X with maximum probability of error less than or equal
to . Moreover, the type of the codewords in Dsi is fixed, and therefore for any x ∈ Dsi , [18, Theorem 28] yields that
log |Dsi | 6 − log β1−
(
WY|X=x, P
⊗n
0
)
. (172)
Furthermore, similar to [19], by [18, Equation 102], we obtain for any γ > 0
−logβ1−
(
WY|X=x, P
⊗n
0
)
6 γ − log
(
1− − PWY|X=x
(
log
WY|X(Y|x)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
> γ
))
. (173)
However, we know that WY|X(Y|x) =
∏
k:xk=1
P1(Yk)
∏
j:xj=0
P0(Yj) which yields that if Y˜1, · · · , Y˜i are i.i.d. according to
P1, then
PWY|X=x
(
log
WY|X(Y|x)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
> γ
)
= PP ⊗i1
(
i∑
k=1
log
P1(Y˜k)
P0(Y˜k)
> γ
)
. (174)
By Theorem 6, we have
P
(
i∑
k=1
log
P1(Y˜k)
P0(Y˜k)
> γ
)
6 Q
(
γ − iDP√
iVP
)
+
B√
i
, (175)
where B just depends on the channel. Setting γ = iDP +
√
iVPQ
−1(1− − 2B√
i
) and combining all above equations, we have
log |Dsi | 6 iDP +
√
iVPQ
−1(1− )− log
(
B√
i
)
. (176)
18
Hence, we obtain
log
M
nh
6 log |D ∩ Cs| (177)
= log
√ng(δ)+C∑
i=0
|Dsi |
 (178)
6 log
√ng(δ)+C∑
i=0
exp(iDP +
√
iVPQ
−1(1− )− log
(
B√
i
)
) (179)
6 log
(
(
√
ng(δ) + C) exp(g(δ)DPn
1
2 −
√
VP g(δ)Q
−1()n
1
4 +O(1))
)
. (180)
Thus, we get
logM 6 g(δ)DPn
1
2 −
√
g(δ)VPQ
−1()n
1
4 + (h+ 1) log n− log(B) + log(√ng(δ) + C) +O(1). (181)
Note that we need not worry about exotic channels for  ∈ ( 12 , 1) since the constants DP and VP are known and fixed.
Consider now a sequence of (Mn,Kn, n, n, δ) code for which subsets Dn ⊂ Cn exist and (169) holds. Recall that n is
defined as per (16). By the pigeon hole principle, for every n, there exists a sub-codebook Cn(s) consisting of all codewords
indexed by the same key s ∈ J1,KnK, such that |Cn(s) ∩ Dn| > |Dn|Kn , and the maximum probability of error corresponding toCn(s) ∩ Dn is at most n. Following the exact same converse steps as in [10, Section VI], we obtain for n large enough that
log |Cn(s) ∩ Dn| 6 1
1− n
(√
n (g(δ) + o(1)) +Hb (n)
)
. (182)
Consequently,
logMn 6 log |Cn(s) ∩ Dn|+ log MnKn|Dn| (183)
6 1
1− n
(√
n (g(δ) + o(1)) +Hb (n)
)
+ log
MnKn
|Dn| (184)
and
lim
n→∞
logMn√
n
= g(δ). (185)
IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION WITH SPECIFIC COVERTNESS METRICS
We now leverage the general results established in Section III and specialize them to study three covertness metrics: relative
entropy (Subsection IV-A), variational distance (Subsection IV-B), and probability of missed detection (Subsection IV-C). As
alluded to earlier, all that needs to be done is: (i) establish that the metric under consideration is a quasi metric, as defined at
the beginning of Section III; (ii) verify that the conditions of Theorem 5 and Theorem 7 are satisfied.
A. Covertness in relative entropy
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 9. Relative entropy is a quasi-metric, i.e.,
∀P,Q,R : D(R‖Q) 6 D(P‖Q) + D(R‖P ) +
√
D(R‖P ) max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
)
. (186)
Proof: Note that
D(R‖Q) =
∑
z
R(z) log
R(z)
Q(z)
(187)
=
∑
z
R(z) log
R(z)
P (z)
+
∑
z
R(z) log
P (z)
Q(z)
(188)
= D(R‖P ) +
∑
z
R(z) log
P (z)
Q(z)
(189)
= D(R‖P ) + D(P‖Q) +
∑
z
(R(z)− P (z)) log P (z)
Q(z)
(190)
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6 D(R‖P ) + D(P‖Q) + log 1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
V(R,P ) (191)
6 D(R‖P ) + D(P‖Q) +
√
D(R‖P ) log 1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
(192)
6 D(P‖Q) + D(R‖P ) +
√
D(R‖P ) max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
)
. (193)
Achievability of Theorem 1: Fix  ∈]0, 1[ and δ > 0, and define ω ,
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0) and `n , bω
√
n− tc where the value
of t will be determined later. To use Theorem 5, we choose PnX , P
n,`n
X,PPM, and we set
logMn , `nDP −
√
`nVPQ
−1
(
− 1 + 6TP /V
3
2
P√
`n
)
− 13 log n (194)
= ωDPn
1
2 −
√
ωVPQ
−1 ()n
1
4 − 13 log n+O(1), (195)
and
logMn + logKn , max(logMn, (1 + ρ)`nDQ) (196)
= max(logMn, (1 + ρ)ωDQn
1
2 +O(1)). (197)
By Lemma 8, we know that for n large enough and some C > 0
D
(
Pn,`nZ,PPM‖Q⊗n0
)
6 `
2
n
2n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) + `
3
nC
n2
(198)
6 (ω
√
n− t)2
2n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) + (ω
√
n− t)3C
n2
(199)
6 1
2
ω2χ2(Q1‖Q0)− tωχ2(Q1‖Q0)√
n
+
t2χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2n
+
ω3C√
n
(200)
(a)
6 1
2
ω2χ2(Q1‖Q0)− 1√
n
, (201)
where (a) is true for t > 1+ω
3C
ωχ2(Q1‖Q0) and n large enough. Furthermore, by Lemma 6, we have
EPn,`nY,PPM
(
Pn,`nY,PPM(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
6 exp
(
`n(`n + 1)
n
χ2(P1‖P0)
)
= O(1). (202)
Hence, for large enough n, we have
FXY|P ⊗n0
(
log
(
n13Mn
))
+
EPn,`nY,PPM
(
Pn,`nY,PPM(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
n
= FXY|P ⊗n0
(
`nDP −
√
`nVPQ
−1
(
− 1 + 6TP /V
3
2
P√
`n
))
+O
(
1
n
)
(a)
6 Q

`nDP − `nDP +
√
`nVPQ
−1
(
− 1+6TP /V
3
2
P√
`n
)
√
`nVP
+ 6TP√`nV 3P +O
(
1
n
)
6 ,
(203)
where (a) follows from Lemma 5. By Lemma 7, for any ρ > 0, we have
FXZ
(
log
MnKn
n4
)
6 exp
(
−
(
log MnKnn4 − `nDQ
)2
`n log
2(n/`n)
)
(204)
6 exp
(
− ((1 + ρ)`nDQ − 4 log n− `nDQ)
2
`n log
2(n/`n)
)
(205)
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6 exp
(
−`n (ρDQ − 4 log n/`n)
2
log2(n/`n)
)
(206)
(a)
6 1
n6
, (207)
where (a) is true for large enough n. Thus, all the conditions in Theorem 5 hold, and we obtain
logM∗D(n, , δ) > ωDPn
1
2 −
√
ωVPQ
−1 ()n
1
4 − 13 log n+O(1). (208)
Converse of Theorem 1: We only focus on the converse for second-order asymptotics since the first-order result follows
from [10], [11]. For an (M,K, n, , δ)D code, we briefly outline for completeness the argument of [10] to obtain an upper-bound
on the average weight of the codewords. Note that, by [10, Equation (96)],
δ > D
(
P̂Z‖Qn0
) (a)
> nD
(
PZ‖Q0
)
, (209)
where PZ(z) , 1n P̂Zi(z). We know that PZ = µQ1 + (1− µ)Q0 for µ , 1MK
∑
w∈J1,MK,s∈J1,KK wt(xs,w)n . Therefore, by [10,
Equation (11)], we have
D
(
PZ‖Q0
)
> µ
2
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)−O(µ3). (210)
Combining these two bounds, we obtain
1
MK
K∑
s=1
M∑
w=1
wt(xsw) 6 (B +
√
n)
√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0) , (211)
for some B > 0 depending on the channel. Thus, we can choose a subset D of codewords of size MK/n such that
maxx∈D wt(x)√
n
6 n
n− 1
(
B√
n
+ 1
)√
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0) . (212)
Applying Theorem 7 completes the converse proof.
B. Covertness with variational distance
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 2.
Lemma 10. Total variation is a quasi-metric for distributions, i.e., for all distributions P , Q, and R defined over Z , we have
V(R,Q) 6 V(P,Q) + D(R‖Q) +
√
D(R‖P ) max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
)
. (213)
Proof: Total variation is a metric, and therefore we have
V(R,Q) 6 V(P,Q) + V(R,P ) (214)
(a)
6 V(P,Q) +
√
D(R‖P ) (215)
6 V(P,Q) + D(R‖Q) +
√
D(R‖P ) max
(
1, log
1
minz:Q(z)>0Q(z)
)
, (216)
where (a) follows from Pinsker’s Inequality.
Achievability of Theorem 2: Fix , δ ∈]0, 1[ and n. Similar to the analysis for relative entropy, we use Theorem 5 with
PnX , P
n,`n
X,PPM where `n is chosen to ensure V
(
Pn,`nZ,PPM, Q
⊗n
0
)
6 δ − 1√
n
. Specifically, upon setting Γ , Q−1
(
1−δ
2
)
, we wish
to choose `n such that
`n
2
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
> Γ− e
Γ2
2
√
2pi√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (217)
The term Γ is what we would expect by inspection of (136) to obtain a variational distance with first order approximately
δ. As we shall see next, the penalty term e
Γ2
2
√
2pi√
`n
is the result of a Taylor series of the Q function around Γ. Formally, we
choose
√
`n as a solution of the cubic equation
x3 − 2
(
Γ +O
(
1√
n
))√
n
χ2(Q1‖Q0)x+ 2
√
2pie
Γ2
2
√
n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) = 0, (218)
21
which will be sufficient to ensure (217). For a cubic equation of the form x3 − px + q = 0, the roots are known in closed
algebraic form and one of them is 2
√
−p
3 cos
(
1
3 arccos
(
3q
2p
√
−3
p
))
. Thus,
√
`n = 2
√√√√2(Γ +O( 1√n))√n
3
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
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1
3
arccos
− 3√2pieΓ22
2
(
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(
1√
n
))√√√√ 3√χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
(
Γ +O
(
1√
n
))√
n
 (219)
(a)
= 2
√√√√2(Γ +O( 1√n))√n
3
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
cos
1
3
pi
2
+
3
√
2pie
Γ2
2
2Γ
√
3
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2Γ
√
n
+O
(
1√
n
) (220)
(b)
= 2
√√√√2(Γ +O( 1√n))√n
3
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
√3
2
− 1
2
√
2pie
Γ2
2
2Γ
√
3
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2Γ
√
n
+O
(
1√
n
) (221)
=
√
2Γ
√
n√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
−
√
pi
2
e
Γ2
2
Γ
+O
(
1
n
1
4
)
, (222)
where (a) and (b) follow since, for x close to zero, arccos(x) = pi2 − x + O(x2) and cos
(
pi
6 + x
)
=
√
3
2 − 12x + O(x2),
respectively. Consequently, upon choosing
`n = 2Γ
√
n
χ2(Q1‖Q0) −
2
√
pie
Γ2
2 n
1
4√
Γχ2(Q1‖Q0) 14
+O(1), (223)
we satisfy (217). Combining with (136), we have
V
(
Pn,`nZ,PPM, Q
⊗n
0
)
6 1− 2Q
(
`n
2
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
)
+
2√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
(224)
6 1− 2Q
(
Γ− e
Γ2
2
√
2pi√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
))
+
2√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
(225)
(a)
6 1− 2Q(Γ)− 2√
`n
+
2√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
(226)
= δ +O
(
1√
n
)
, (227)
where (a) follows from Q(x − y) > Q(x) + e−
x2
2 y√
2pi
for x > y > 0. Finally, we can control the term O
(
1√
n
)
in (217) to
guarantee that (227) is less than δ − 1√
n
.
Finally, let
logMn , `nDP −
√
`nVPQ
−1
(
− 1 + 6TP /V
3
2
P√
`n
)
− 13 log n (228)
and for some ρ > 0,
logMn + logKn , max(logMn, (1 + ρ)`nDQ). (229)
Similar to (203), we can show that, for large enough n,
FXY|P ⊗n0
(
log
(
n13Mn
))
+
EPn,`nY,PPM
(
Pn,`nY,PPM(Y)
P ⊗n0 (Y)
)
n
6 , (230)
and
FXZ
(
log
MnKn
n4
)
6 1
n6
. (231)
Thus, all the conditions in Theorem 5 hold, and we obtain
logM∗V (n, , δ) > `nDP −
√
`nVPQ
−1 ()− 13 log n+O(1) (232)
=
2ΓDPn
1
2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
−
(√
2ΓVP√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1 () +
2
√
pie
Γ2
2 DP√
Γχ2(Q1‖Q0) 14
)
n
1
4 − 13 log n+O(1). (233)
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To develop the converse for variational distance, we start by relating the variational distance V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
to the minimum
weight of the codewords.
Lemma 11. Consider a binary-input DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) and M codewords x1, · · · , xM ∈ Xn with induced distribution P̂Z
on Zn. If wmin , minm∈J1,MK wt(xm), then we have
V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
> 1− 2Q
(
wmin
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
√
n
)
− B√
n
− w
2
minB
n
3
2
, (234)
where B is a constant that only depends on the channel.
Proof: To lower bound V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
, we introduce a hypothesis testing problem with two hypotheses H0 and H1
corresponding to distributions Q⊗n0 and P̂Z, respectively. We know that for any test with probability of false alarm and
missed detection α and β, respectively, we have
V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
> 1− α− β. (235)
Hence, to link the variational distance to the weight of codewords, it suffices to introduce a test for which α and β conveniently
relate to the weight of codewords. We consider here the sub-optimal test
T (z) , 1
{
n∑
i=1
A(zi) > τ
}
, (236)
where A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z) and τ is an arbitrary constant that is determined later. Intuitively, this test plays the same role
for DMCs as the radiometer played for Gaussian channels [6] in that it only depends on the codeword weight. To bound the
probability of false alarm, we use Theorem 6 to obtain
PH0
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) > τ
)
6 Q
(
τ − nµ0√
nσ0
)
+
6t0
σ30
√
n
, (237)
with
µ0 , EQ0(A(Z)), σ20 , VarQ0 (A(Z)) , t0 , EQ0
(|A(Z)− µ0|3). (238)
Note that all above quantities are finite. For the probability of missed detection, we condition on the codeword transmitted by
the channel to obtain with Theorem 6
PH1
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) 6 τ
)
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
P
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) 6 τ |X = xm
)
(239)
6
M∑
m=1
1
M
(
Q
(
−τ + nµ0 + wt(xm)(µ1 − µ0)√
nσ20 + wt(xm) (σ21 − σ20)
)
+
6 (t0 + wt(xm)/n(t1 − t0))
(σ20 + wt(xm)/n(σ21 − σ20))3/2
√
n
)
(240)
6
M∑
m=1
1
M
(
Q
(
−τ + nµ0 + wt(xm)(µ1 − µ0)√
nσ20 + wt(xm) (σ21 − σ20)
))
+
B1√
n
, (241)
with
µ1 , EQ1(A(Z)), σ21 , VarQ1 (A(Z)) , t1 , EQ1
(|A(Z)− µ1|3). (242)
If we choose τ = nµ0 + wmin2 (µ1 − µ0), we have
PH1
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) 6 τ
)
6
M∑
m=1
1
M
(
Q
(
wt(xm)(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ20 + wt(xm) (σ21 − σ20)
))
+
B1√
n
. (243)
Note that if we have σ1 6 σ0, then we get
β , PH1
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) 6 τ
)
6 Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
+
B1√
n
. (244)
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Otherwise σ1 > σ0 and we split the summation in (243) into two parts: if wt(xm) > σ1σ0wmin, then we have
Q
(
wt(xm)(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ20 + wt(xm) (σ21 − σ20)
)
(a)
6 Q
(
σ1
σ0
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ1
)
(245)
= Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
, (246)
where (a) follows from σ1 > σ0. If wmin 6 wt(xm) 6 σ1σ0wmin, then we obtain
Q
(
wt(xm)(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ20 + wt(xm) (σ21 − σ20)
)
6 Q
 wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ20 +
σ1
σ0
wmin (σ21 − σ20)
 (247)
= Q
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
 1√
1 + σ1
σ30
wmin
n (σ
2
1 − σ20)
 (248)
(a)
6 Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
(
1− wminB2
n
))
(249)
(b)
6 Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
+
w2minB3
n
3
2
, (250)
for B2 =
σ1(σ
2
1−σ20)
2σ30
> 0 and B3 =
(µ1−µ0)B2
2
√
2piσ0
> 0 where (a) follows from 1√
1+x
> −x2 + 1 for all x > 0, and (b) follow
from Q(x− y) 6 Q(x) + y√
2pi
for all 0 < y < x. Therefore, we always have
β 6 Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
+
w2minB3
n
3
2
+
B1√
n
. (251)
Moreover, plugging in the value τ in (237), we obtain
α , PH0
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) > τ
)
6 Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
+
B0√
n
, (252)
for some positive constant B0. Using (235), (251), and (252), we obtain
V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
> 1− 2Q
(
wmin(µ1 − µ0)
2
√
nσ0
)
− B0 +B1√
n
− w
2
minB3
n
3
2
. (253)
Finally, since µ0 = 0 and σ20 = µ1 = χ2(Q1‖Q0), we have
V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
> 1− 2Q
(
wmin
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
√
n
)
− B0 +B1√
n
− w
2
minB3
n
3
2
. (254)
Next, we develop a bound for the maximum weight of a sub-codebook.
Lemma 12. Let C be an (M,K, n, , δ)V code for a binary-input covert communication channel (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z).
For all γ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a subset of codewords D such that |D| > γMK and
1√
n
max{wt(x) : x ∈ D} 6 2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
− C√
n
− γ
)
, (255)
where C is a constant that depends only on the channel.
Proof: We define
A , 2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
− C2√
n
− γ
)
(256)
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where C2 > 0 is specified later and D , {x ∈ C : wt(x) 6 A
√
n}. The set D satisfies (255), and we just need to check
|D| > γMK. To this end, let P̂1 and P̂2 be the induced output distributions for codes D and C \ D, respectively. Then, we
have
δ
(a)
> V
(
P̂Z, Q
⊗n
0
)
(257)
(b)
> (1− |D|
MK
)V
(
P̂2, Q
⊗n
0
)
− |D|
MK
V
(
P̂1, Q
⊗n
0
)
(258)
(c)
> (1− |D|
MK
)
(
1− B(1 +A
2)√
n
− 2Q
(
A
√
n
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
√
n
))
− |D|
MK
(259)
>
(
1− 2Q
(
A
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
))
− B(1 +A
2)√
n
− 2 |D|
MK
(260)
(d)
=
(
1− 2
(
1− δ
2
− C2√
n
− γ
))
− B(1 +A
2)√
n
− 2 |D|
MK
(261)
(e)
> δ + 2γ − 2 |D|
MK
, (262)
where (a) follows from the definition of an (M,K, n, , δ)V code, (b) follows from the triangle inequality and P̂Z =
|D|
MK P̂1 +
(1− |D|MK )P̂2, (c) follows from Lemma 11, (d) follows from the definition of A, and (e) follows by choosing
C2 >
1
2
B
1 +( 2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
− γ
))2 . (263)
Therefore, we get |D| > γMK.
We can now establish the converse.
Converse for Theorem 2: In Lemma 12, if we set γ = 1√
n
, for any (M,K, n, , δ)V code, we obtain a subset of codewords
D with |D| >MK/√n and
max
x∈D
wt(x)√
n
6 2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
− C√
n
− γ
)
(264)
=
2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (265)
Therefore, by Theorem 7, we have
logM∗V (n, , δ) 6
2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
)
DPn
1
2 −
√
2√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1
(
1− δ
2
)
VPQ
−1()n
1
4 +O(log n). (266)
Lemma 12 already ensures the upper bound needed to apply Theorem 7, and we only need to make sure that we can choose
γ in Lemma 12 such that we can satisfy the other conditions in (169). For every (Mn,Kn, n, n, δ)V code in a sequence of
codes such that limn→∞ n = 0, we choose γn = 1n . Then,
lim
n→∞−
log γn√
n
= 0. (267)
Hence, the results follows by Theorem 7.
C. Covertness with probability of missed detection at fixed significance level
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 13. For a fixed α ∈]0, 1[ and two distributions P and Q over same set Z , we define d(P,Q) , 1− α − βα(Q,P );
then d is a quasi-metric, and we have
d(R,Q) 6 d(P,Q) + D(R‖P ) +
√
D(R‖P ) max
(
1, log
1
minz Q(z)
)
. (268)
Proof: By definition of βα(Q,R), there exists a set T with Q(T ) 6 α and R(T ) = βα(Q,R); therefore we have
βα(Q,P ) 6 P (T ) (269)
= R(T ) + (P (T )−R(T )) (270)
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6 R(T ) + V(R,P ) (271)
= βα(Q,R) + V(R,P ). (272)
By Pinsker’s Inequality, we obtain
βα(Q,R) + V(R,P ) 6 βα(Q,R) +
√
D(R‖P ). (273)
Finally, using the definition of d(P,Q), we get the result.
Achievability of Theorem 3: Fix  ∈]0, 1[, δ ∈]0, 1 − α[, and n; we just show how we can choose `n such that
βα(Q
⊗n
0 , P
n,`n
Z,PPM) > 1−α−δ+ 1√n and the rest of the proof is similar to the proof for variational distance. Let Λ , Q−1(1−α−δ)
and Υ , Q−1(α); we wish to choose `n to satisfy
`n
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(
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)
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(274)
Using Q−1(α+ x) = Q−1(α)−√2pie (
Q−1(α))
2
2 x+O(x2) = Υ +
√
2pie
Υ2
2 x+O(x2) for x close to zero, the above inequality
is equivalent to
`n
√
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√
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We form the cubic equation
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(
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))√
n
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√
2pi
(
e
Λ2
2 + e
Υ2
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χ2(Q1‖Q0) = 0, (276)
and set
√
`n to be its solution; Thus, similar to (222), we obtain
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. (280)
Hence, if we choose
`n =
(Λ + Υ)√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
1
2 −
√
2pi
(
e
Λ2
2 + e
Υ2
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)
√
Λ + Υχ2(Q1‖Q0) 14
n
1
4 +O(1), (281)
we have
βα(Q
⊗n
0 , P
n,`n
Z,PPM)
(a)
> Q
(
`n
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
n
−Q−1
(
α+
1
`n
))
− 1√
`n
+O
(
1√
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(282)
(b)
> Q
(
Λ−
√
2pie
Λ2
2√
`n
+O
(
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n
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− 1√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
(283)
(c)
> Q(Λ) + 1√
`n
− 1√
`n
+O
(
1√
n
)
(284)
= 1− α− δ +O
(
1√
n
)
, (285)
where (a) follows from (137), (b) follows from (274), and (c) follows from Q(Λ +x) = Q(Λ) + x√
2pie
Λ2
2
+O(x2) for x close
to zero.
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The proof of the converse of Theorem 3 requires the following steps similar to those of covertness with variational distance.
We first relate the probability of missed detection βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P̂Z
)
at significance level α to the minimum weight of codewords.
Lemma 14. Consider a binary-input DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) and M codewords x1, · · · , xM ∈ Xn with induced distribution P̂Z
on Zn. If
√
nQ−1(α)√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
< wmin , minm∈J1,MK wt(xm), we have
βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P̂Z
)
6 Q
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√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)√
n
−Q−1(α)
)
+
B√
n
+
w2minB
n
3
2
, (286)
where B is a constant that just depends on the channel.
Proof: For the hypothesis testing problem consisting of two hypotheses H0 with distribution Q⊗n0 and H1 with distribution
P̂Z, we introduce again the test
T (z) , 1
{
n∑
i=1
A(zi) > τ
}
, (287)
where A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z) . Using Theorem 6 and the calculations in the proof of Lemma 11, we have
PH0
(
n∑
i=1
A(Zi) > τ
)
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(
τ√
nχ2(Q1‖Q0)
)
+O
(
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n
)
. (288)
Thus, if we choose τ =
√
nχ2(Q1‖Q0)Q−1
(
α+O
(
n−
1
2
))
, the false alarm probability would be less than or equal to α.
Hence, by definition of βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P̂Z
)
, we get
βα
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)
6 PH1
(
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A(Zi) 6 τ
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=
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1
M
P
(
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i=1
A(Zi) 6 τ |X = xi
)
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=
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1
M
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(
−τ + χ2(Q1‖Q0)wt(xi)√
nχ2(Q1‖Q0) + wt(xi)(σ11 − σ20)
)
+O
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1
2
))
, (291)
with
σ20 , VarQ0(A(Z)) and σ21 , VarQ1(A(Z)). (292)
Plugging in the value of τ , we obtain
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)
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M
Q
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α+O
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Analogous to the proof of Lemma 11, we obtain
βα
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Q⊗n0 , P̂Z
)
6 Q
(
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3
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. (295)
Next, we develop an upper bound on the weight of codewords as a function of channel characteristics and covertness
measured in terms of probability of missed detection.
Lemma 15. Let (X ,WY |X ,WZ|X ,Y,Z) be a binary-input covert communication channel and C be an (M,K, n, , δ, α)β
code. For all γ ∈ [0, 1], we can choose a subset of codewords D such that |D| > γMK and
1√
n
max{wt(x) : x ∈ D} 6 1√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
Q−1
(
1− α− δ − C√
n
− γ
)
+Q−1(α)
)
, (296)
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where C is a constant that depends just on the channel.
Proof: If A , 1√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
Q−1
(
1− α− δ − C2√
n
− γ
)
+Q−1(α)
)
for C2 > 0 specified later, we define
D , {x ∈ C : wt(x) 6 A√n}. (297)
Obviously, D satisfies (296), and we just need to check |D| > γMK. To do so, let P̂1 and P̂2 be the induced output distributions
for codes D and C \ D, respectively. Using Lemma 14 for C \ D, we get
βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P̂2
)
6 Q
(
A
√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)−Q−1(α)
)
+
B(1 +A2)√
n
(298)
(a)
6 1− α− δ − γ, (299)
where (a) follows from the definition of A and by choosing
C2 >
1
2
B
1 +( 1√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
Q−1 (1− α− δ − γ)
)2 . (300)
This means that there exists T ⊂ Zn such that Q⊗n0 (T ) 6 α and P̂2(T ) 6 1− α− δ − γ. Accordingly, we have
1− α− δ
(a)
6 βα
(
Q⊗n0 , P̂Z
)
(301)
6 P̂Z(T ) (302)
(b)
=
|D|
MK
P̂1(T ) + (1− |D|
MK
)P̂2(T ) (303)
6 |D|
MK
+ 1− α− δ − γ, (304)
where (a) follows from the definition of an (M,K, n, , δ, α)β code, and (b) follows from P̂Z =
|D|
MK P̂1 + (1 − |D|MK )P̂2.
Simplifying the above inequality, we get |D| > γMK.
The converse then proceeds as for the converse of Theorem 2 in the previous section.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed an approach to study covert communication when covertness is measured with several “quasi-metrics,”
as defined in Section III. It is legitimate to ask which metric would make most sense from an operational perspective. While
relative entropy is amenable to a fairly extensive information-theoretic analysis, as illustrated by our complete characterization
of second-order asymptotics in Theorem 1, variational distance and probability of false alarm are probably more adequate
since they directly relate to the operation of an adversary attempting to detect communication. Since measuring covertness in
terms of variational distance does not impose any constraint on where the adversary operates on its ROC curve, we believe
that variational distance is perhaps the most operationally relevant covertness metric.
Our results have been restricted to binary-input DMCs to obtain simple closed-form expressions but extensions to arbitrary
finite input alphabets may be obtained following the approach of [11]; however several research questions remain open. We
have not characterized the exact second-order asymptotics of covert communication with variational distance and probability
of missed detection metrics; we conjecture, however, that the upper-bounds are achievable. We have also not characterized the
second-order asymptotics for the number of key bits required; a close inspection of our current proof technique shows that we
explicitly rely on a law of large numbers to analyze the number of key bits, which one would have to circumvent.
APPENDIX A
THE EFFECT OF AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF ERROR ON FIRST ORDER ASYMPTOTICS
Assume that the optimal second order asymptotics are of the form
logM∗(, δ) = f(δ)
√
n+ o(
√
n) (305)
for some function f that is strictly increasing in δ and does not depend on , which is what we would hope to establish based
on our results maximum probability of error. Now for 1 >  > 0 and δ > 0, pick 1− > α > 0 and set 
′ = (1 + α) − α,
and δ′ = (1 + α)δ. Since δ′ > δ and because of (305), we expect for all blocklengths large enough that
logM∗(′, δ′) > logM∗(, δ).
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Consider now a code with M∗(′, δ′) codewords, and let Q̂′
n
be the distribution induced at the eavesdropper’s output when
randomizing uniformly over all codewords. Let S be a set (with repetition) of N , αM∗(′, δ′) all-zero codewords. We
construct a new code by adding the set S to the previous code. The resulting code has average probability of error
Pavg = P
(
Ŵ 6= W |W ∈ S
)
P(W ∈ S) + P
(
Ŵ 6= W |W /∈ S
)
P(W /∈ S)
6 M
∗(′, δ′)
M∗(′, δ′) +N
′ +
N
M∗(′, δ′) +N
=
1
1 + α
′ +
α
1 + α
= .
It also induces a new distribution Q̂n at the eavesdropper’s output when randomizing uniformly over all codewords, such that
D
(
Q̂′
n‖Q⊗n0
)
= D
(
M∗(′, δ′)
M∗(′, δ′) +N
Q̂n +
N
M∗(′, δ′) +N
Q⊗n0 ‖Q⊗n0
)
6 M
∗(′, δ′)
M∗(′, δ′) +N
δ′ =
1
1 + α
δ′ = δ.
We therefore obtain a new code with probability of error less than  and relative entropy less than δ, but with a number of
codewords M∗(′, δ′) + N that exceeds M∗(, δ). This contradiction shows that (305) does not hold, so that either f(δ) is
non-increasing or δ or depends on . In both cases, this suggests a result significantly more complex that what we were trying
to establish. Note that this does not contradict existing results on covert capacity [11], [10] because these works have all been
in the regime limn→∞  = 0. Finally, from this example, we conclude that no strong converse exists when measuring reliability
with an average probability of error and even the first-order asymptotics depend on a non-vanishing average probability of
error. Hence, one could expect a much more challenging analysis of second-order asymptotics under average probability of
error constraint.
APPENDIX B
A TECHNICAL LEMMA
Lemma 16. Suppose Z , (Z1, · · · , Zm) is distributed according to Q⊗m0 . Define A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z) and let B ,
1
m
∑m
i=1A(Zi). Also define B with distribution P(B = b) , P(B = b|B 6= −1) and C , log(1 +B). There exists a constant
0 6 τ < 1 depending only on the channel such that
E(B) = O(τm), (306)
E
(
B2
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O(τm), (307)
E
(
B3
)
= O
(
1
m2
)
, (308)
E
(
B4
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2
+O
(
1
m3
)
, (309)
and
E(C) = −χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(310)
Var(C) =
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(311)
E
(|C − E(C)|3) 6 χ2(Q1‖Q0) 32
m
3
2
+O
(
1
m
9
4
)
. (312)
Suppose Z˜ , (Z˜1, · · · , Z˜m) is distributed according to Pm,1Z,PPM. Define B˜ , 1m
∑m
i=1A(Z˜i), B˜ with distribution P
(
B˜ = b
)
,
P
(
B˜ = b|B˜ 6= −1
)
and C˜ , log(1 + B˜). Then
E
(
B˜
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O(τm), (313)
E
(
B˜
2
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
, (314)
E
(
B˜
3
)
= O
(
1
m2
)
, (315)
E
(
B˜
4
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2
+O
(
1
m3
)
, (316)
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and
E
(
C˜
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(317)
Var
(
C˜
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(318)
E
(
|C˜ − E
(
C˜
)
|3
)
6 χ2(Q1‖Q0)
3
2
m
3
2
+O
(
1
m
9
4
)
. (319)
Proof: We first show that the moments of B and B are close. Define κ , maxz:Q0(z)>0
∣∣∣Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z) ∣∣∣ and τ ,
PQ0(A(Z) = −1). Notice that V
(
PB , PB
)
= τm, |B| 6 κ and |B| 6 κ almost surely and that κ does not depend on
m. For any q > 1, we therefore obtain
|E(Bq)− E(Bq)| 6
∑
b
|bq(P(B = b)− P(B = b))| (320)
6 κqV
(
PB , PB
)
(321)
= κqτm. (322)
Therefore, it is sufficient to find E
(
Bi
)
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note that
EQ0(A(Z)) = 0 (323)
EQ1(A(Z)) = χ2(Q1‖Q0) (324)
VarQ0(A(Z)) = χ2(Q1‖Q0). (325)
Hence, we obtain
E(B) = E
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
A(Zi)
)
= 0, (326)
E
(
B2
)
=
1
m2
E
( m∑
i=1
A(Zi)
)2 = 1
m2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
E(A(Zi)A(Zj)) =
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
(327)
E
(
B3
)
=
1
m3
E
 m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
A(Zi)A(Zk)A(Zj)
 = ∑mi=1 E(A(Zi)3)
m3
= O
(
1
m2
)
(328)
E
(
B4
)
=
1
m4
E
 m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
m∑
t=1
A(Zi)A(Zj)A(Zk)A(Zt)
 (329)
=
∑m
i=1A(Zi)
4 + 2
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=i+1 E
(
A(Zi)
2
)
E
(
A(Zj)
2
)
m4
(330)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2
+
−χ2(Q1‖Q0) + EQ0
(
A(Z)4
)
m3
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2
+O
(
1
m3
)
. (331)
To find the expected value of C, note that ln(1 + x) 6 x− x22 + x
3
3 , and therefore, we have
E(C) = E(log(1 +B)) 6 E(B)− E
(
B2
2
)
+ E
(
B3
3
)
= −χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
. (332)
For any 0 < a < 1 and x > −a, we also have x− x22 + x
3
3 − x
4
4(1−a)4 6 ln(1 + x); thus,
E(C) > E(B)− E
(
B2
2
)
+ E
(
B3
3
)
− E
(
B4
4(1 + minb:P(B=b)>0 b)4
)
(333)
= −χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
−
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2 +O
(
1
m3
)
4(1 + minb:P(B=b)>0 b)4
(334)
= −χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
−
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2 +O
(
1
m3
)
4(1 + minz:Q0(z)>0,Q1(z)A(z))
4
(335)
(a)
= −χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2m
+O
(
1
m2
)
, (336)
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where (a) follows since minz:Q0(z)>0,Q1(z)>0A(z) > −1. Furthermore, for the variance of C, since log2(1+x) >
(
x− x22
)2
−
x4, we have
Var(C) = E
(
C2
)− E(C)2 (337)
> E
((
B − B
2
2
)2)
− E(B4)+O( 1
m2
)
(338)
= E
(
B2
)− E(B3)− E(3
4
B4
)
+O
(
1
m2
)
(339)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(340)
Moreover, for −1 < a < 0 and x > −a, we have log2(1 + x) 6
(
x− x22 + x
3
3(1−a)3
)2
. Therefore,
Var(C) = E
(
C2
)− E(C)2 (341)
> E
((
B − B
2
2
− B
3
3(1−minz:Q0(z)>0,Q1(z)>0A(z))3
))
+O
(
1
m2
)
(342)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
. (343)
Finally, for the third moment of C, note that
E
(|C − E(C)|3) = E(((C − E(C))4) 34) (344)
(a)
6
(
E
(
(C − E(C))4
)) 3
4
(345)
=
(
E
(
C4 − 4C3E(C) + 6C2(E(C))2 − 4C(E(C))3 + (E(C))4)) 34 (346)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0) 32
m
3
2
+O
(
1
m
9
4
)
, (347)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
We now calculate the moments with respect to PPM distribution. First note that if we define P iZ(z) , Q1(zi)
∏
j 6=iQ0(zj),
then we can write Pm,1Z,PPM =
1
mP
i
Z; therefore, for any function of Z˜ such as f(Z˜), we have EPm,1Z,PPM
(
f(Z˜)
)
= 1m
∑m
i=1 EP iZ
(
f(Z˜)
)
.
Moreover, if f is invariant with respect to all permutation of elements of z, then EPm,1Z,PPM
(
f(Z˜)
)
= EP 1Z
(
f(Z˜)
)
. One can
check that this property holds for all moments of B˜ and C˜. Therefore, in the sequel, we assume that Z˜ is distributed according
to P 1Z. Hence, we have
E
(
B˜
)
= E
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
A(Z˜i)
)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
, (348)
E
(
B˜2
)
=
1
m2
E
( m∑
i=1
A(Z˜i)
)2 = 1
m2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
E
(
A(Z˜i)A(Z˜j)
)
=
(m− 1)χ2(Q1‖Q0) + EQ1
(
A(Z)2
)
m2
(349)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
m
+O
(
1
m2
)
(350)
E
(
B˜3
)
=
1
m3
E
 m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
A(Z˜i)A(Z˜k)A(Z˜j)
 = ∑mi=1 E
(
A(Z˜i)
3
)
+
∑m
i=2 E
(
A(Z˜1)A(Z˜i)
2
)
m3
= O
(
1
m2
)
(351)
E
(
B˜4
)
=
1
m4
E
 m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1
m∑
t=1
A(Z˜i)A(Z˜j)A(Z˜k)A(Z˜t)
 (352)
=
∑m
i=1A(Z˜i)
4 + 2
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=i+1 E
(
A(Z˜i)
2
)
E
(
A(Z˜j)
2
)
+
∑m
i=2 E
(
A(Z˜1)A(Z˜i)
3
)
m4
(353)
=
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2
m2
+O
(
1
m3
)
. (354)
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One can show that
∣∣∣E(B˜q)− E(B˜q)∣∣∣ = O(τm) as was done earlier for B and B. Using then the same bounds for log(1 +x)
as before and the above calculations, we obtain the desired bounds for the moments of C˜.
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